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Probation reform, the RAR and the forgotten ingredient of supervision 
 
Introduction 
 
In the hubbub of the Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) reforms, the longest standing element 
of community-based sanctions and measures - latterly known as the Supervision 
Requirement - was quietly extinguished. Based on the idea of forming a purposeful working 
relationship between supervisor and supervisee, supervision had been the foundation of 
probation practice in England & Wales for more than a century (Vanstone 2004; Robinson & 
McNeill 2017) and research conducted over many years has established its importance as a 
key ingredient of effective one-to-one work with offenders (e.g. Robinson 2005; Shapland et 
al 2012; Robinson et al 2014; Smith et al 2018; Dominey 2019). In this comment piece, we 
argue that the current proposals for a further wave of probation reforms in England & Wales 
(Ministry of Justice 2019a) present an opportune moment to revisit the evidence base that 
underpins effective rehabilitative work, reinstate supervision as the bedrock of effective 
probation practice and do away with the failed Rehabilitation Activity Requirement (RAR) 
which replaced it. We further argue that where supervision is ordered as part of a 
Community Order (CO) or Suspended Sentence Order (SSO) this should be delivered by the 
case manager1 situated in the National Probation Service (NPS): supervision should not be 
part of a package of intervention that is contracted out to another provider.  
 
Farewell to supervision: a RAR is born 
 
In February 2015, the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 (ORA 2014) removed both the 
Supervision Requirement and the Activity Requirement from the menu of options that could 
form part of a CO or SSO. The Act replaced both options with a new Rehabilitation Activity 
Requirement. As intended, the RAR quickly became popular, featuring in 29% of COs and 
SSOs in the first year, rising to 39% and 41% for COs and SSOs respectively by the first 
quarter of 2019 (Ministry of Justice 2019b: Table 4.4).  
 
The reasoning behind the introduction of the RAR was never terribly explicit, but its creation 
was intimately entwined with the bifurcation of probation services under the TR reforms 
(Ministry of Justice 2013). Expressed only as a µmaximum number of days¶25$, the 
RAR was designed as a shell for rehabilitative interventions, the precise nature of which is 
determined - and amended as necessary - after sentencing by the allocated case manager. 
Following the TR reforms, sentencing advice is provided in court by staff employed by the 
National Probation Service.  The NPS is also responsible for managing individuals assessed 
as posing a high risk of harm, whereas those assessed as posing medium or low risk are 
managed by Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs).  CRCs are responsible for more 
than 80% of COs and SSOs (Ministry of Justice 2019b: Table 4.8).  In this context, the RAR 
was conceived as an enabler of flexible ± and potentially innovative - rehabilitative work 
amenable to delivery in a fragmented and marketised world. The precise detail of the RAR 
would not need to be planned or outlined by NPS court staff in their pre-sentence reports 
(HMIP 2017) and thus, their use was an act of faith: both sentencers and NPS court staff 
                                               
1
 The case manager is the worker responsible for assessing the service user, drawing up a sentence 
plan, reviewing progress and taking action in the event of non-compliance.  Ministry of Justice 
documents often refer to this worker as the offender manager or Responsible Officer. 
had to trust that the CRC case manager (in consultation with the service user) would 
populate the time allotted to the RAR appropriately and then undertake the planned work 
robustly. 
 
Alas, an inspection of the implementation and delivery of RARs published in early 2017 
offered little in the way of reassurance (HMIP 2017). In the sample of cases inspected, HM 
Inspectorate of Probation found very few examples of innovation and an overall lack of 
momentum and direction in the delivery of RAR days. Only 22% of the required days had 
been completed after 9 months, there was a lack of purposeful activity and inspectors found 
that staff were allowing too many missed appointments.  Service user engagement in 
planning RARs was found to be generally poor and disrupted in some cases by changes of 
case manager. Furthermore, service users struggled to understand the terms of their RARs, 
and practitioners expressed confusion both DERXWZKDWFRXOGEHµFRXQWHG¶DVSDUWRIVXFKD
requirement, and about the distinction between RAR activity days and RAR appointments. 
Finally - but arguably not surprisingly in light of the above - inspectors found early signs of a 
reduction in sentencer confidence. RARs, then, were some distance from realising their 
potential to µliberate probation services¶ to do rehabilitation in new and creative ways (HMIP 
2017: 4).  Their shortcomings appeared to arise from the organisational divide between NPS 
and the CRCs along with confusion about the purpose of the requirement and insufficient 
resources to deliver the intended work.     
 
Proposals for reform: ambiguities and missed opportunities 
 
The Government is proposing another shake-up of probation services (Ministry of Justice 
2019a).  One element of these plans ± the bringing together of all case management under 
the single organisational umbrella of an expanded NPS - has attracted much attention as it 
goes beyond the µWZHDNLQJ¶RIH[LVWLQJSURYLVLRQ set out at the start of the consultation and 
entails the demise of the CRCs. But an important aspect of the proposals which has 
attracted little to no attention is the specification of the case management role that will fall to 
probation workers employed by the NPS. This role, on our reading, appears to be purely 
managerial/administrative, and fails to give due consideration to either the relationship 
between case manager and service user, or (importantly) the legal mechanism needed to 
underpin a meaningful supervisory role. The proposals are also ambiguous about the future 
of the RAR.  
 
In the Draft Operating Blueprint published in June 2019, µoffender management¶ is said to 
µinclude managing the sentence specification, risk and need assessments, sentence 
planning, oversight, enforcement, breach and recall¶(HMPPS 2019: 5). Where this role is 
fleshed out in more detail (on pp. 25-31) it continues to be presented in administrative terms, 
being made up of µa sequence of tasks and functions¶ (p. 25).  While it is acknowledged that 
there is a significant volume of research which µevidences the importance of the 
development of positive relationships between the offender and Responsible Officer¶ in 
supporting rehabilitation and facilitating desistance (p. 27), the Blueprint more often uses the 
language of contact, management and oversight than supervision, motivation and support. 
 
Meanwhile, the Blueprint anticipates that µall key services¶ ± including µ8QSDLG:RUNWKH
PDMRULW\RI$FFUHGLWHG3URJUDPPHV¶DQGµother resettlement and rehabilitative 
interventions¶ - are to be purchased from private and voluntary sector organisations 
(HMPPS 2019: 6, emphasis added). This implies an intention to include RARs in the 
significant package of requirements that will be outsourced to providers beyond the NPS 
and, therefore, delivered by someone other than the case manager.  
 
If our reading is correct, the RAR survives the next iteration of probation reform. While this 
may provide some continuity at a time of significant and ongoing disruption for probation 
services, it is hardly evidence-based policy making. Indeed, we argue that retaining the RAR 
with the associated diminution of the supervisory role of the case manager runs contrary to 
all that we know about effective probation practice. 
 
The Blueprint describes a clear divide between the management role of the NPS and the 
intended rehabilitative options delivered under contract by external providers.  The task of 
supervision is now carved up and falls in the gap between the case manager in the NPS and 
the work forming part of the RAR. This strikes us as unduly complicated and confusing for all 
parties, not least service users who value continuity and the foundation of a trusting 
relationship with their case manager and may struggle to make sense of such fragmented 
provision (Rex 1999: Ugwudike 2010; Dominey 2019). For case managers, it perpetuates 
the confusion between RAR appointments and RAR activity days as they strive to negotiate 
a meaningful role across a rigid divide between offender management and externally 
sourced interventions.   
 
The proposals also erroneously imply that good quality supervision can be reduced to, or 
expressed in, quantitative terms alone (e.g. a minimum number of face-to-face contacts). 
Research commissioned by the National Offender Management Service under its own 
Offender Engagement Programme pointed decisively to the reverse: practitioners rejected 
quantitative measures derived from National Standards as proxies for quality. For them, 
good quality supervision meant having the time and resources to form positive working 
relationships with service users (Robinson et al 2014).  The link between professional 
relationships and quality practice is a consistent theme in the probation literature (Shapland 
et al 2012).  Reinstating the supervision requirement would, in our view, be the best way to 
ensure that this essential foundation for effective probation practice is properly resourced 
and enabled. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Blueprint for future probation reform sets out some laudable objectives, which include 
intentions to keep things simple; to ensure rehabilitation comes first; to follow the evidence 
EDVHDQGWRKHHGOHVVRQVOHDUQHGIURPSUREDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\+03362QHZD\WR
achieve all of the above, we argue, is to revoke the RAR and reinstate the two requirements 
which it replaced in 2015: the Supervision Requirement and the Activity Requirement. Whilst 
the latter could be delivered by an external provider, the former should be the unequivocal 
responsibility of the case manager ± the supervisor ± employed by the NPS. 
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